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OBVIOUSNESS AND THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS IN PATENT LAW:
STRIVING FOR OBJECTIVE
CRITERIA
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to promote
technological innovation by granting to inventors the exclusive right to
their discoveries in the form of patents.' Congress has delegated the duty
of granting patents to the Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark
Office.2 The exclusionary right a patent provides' is effected through a
civil action alleging infringement of the patent and seeking injunctive re-
lief, damages, or both.'
Patent law can be divided into two general procedural periods-the
first relating to the procedure of procuring a patent from the Patent and
Trademark Office, and the second relating to the enforcement of the in-
ventor's right to exclude others from exploiting the patented invention.5
In the first period, the invention is fully described in an application con-
taining a disclosure,6 followed by claims designed to outline precisely
1. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the
power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988) ("The Commissioner... shall superintend or perform all
duties required by law respecting the granting and issuing of patents .... ).
3. Upon receiving the grant of a patent, the inventor has the right to exclude others
from "making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States" for a 17-year
term. Id. § 154.
4. Id. §§ 281, 283-284. Injunctive relief is available to prevent infringement of the
exclusive right secured by the patent. Id. § 283. Monetary damages are authorized upon a
finding of infringement in order to provide at least reasonable royalty for use of the inven-
tion and damages in lost profits traceable to the infringement. Id. § 284; see also Panduit
Corp. v. Stablin Bros. Fibre Works Inc., 430 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1970) (setting forth the
criteria necessary to recover damages for profits that would have been made but for the
infringement), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971). Section 284 also provides that the court
may increase the damages up to three times the amount found. 35 U.S.C. § 284. The most
common event triggering enhanced damages is willful infringement shown by the egregious
conduct of the infringer. See, e.g., Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (outlining factors to assist the courts in determining whether enhanced damages are
warranted).
5. 1 IRVING KAYTON, PATENT PRACICE 1-5 (4th ed. 1989).
6. The disclosure is required to contain a written description of the invention in terms
that enable one skilled in the art to which the invention pertains to make and use the
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112. Complete disclosure of the invention so that it may be freely
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what the inventor regards as the invention.7 The claims provide a concise
definition of the invention, used by the Patent and Trademark Office to
determine whether the invention is patentable.' In addition, after issu-
ance of a patent, the claims serve to inform the public of the limits of the
exclusive right asserted, thus making known which features of the inven-
tion may and may not be used without permission from the inventor.9
The conditions the claims must meet in order to be patentable are nov-
elty, utility, and nonobviousness. 1° While all three conditions must be
met, the standard for determining nonobviousness-codified by the Pat-
ent Act of 195211-will be the focus of this Comment.
The issue of nonobviousness arises in the first period of patent law
when the Patent and Trademark Office might reject the inventor's claims
as being obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, thus denying their
patentability.' 2 Following such a determination, the inventor has the op-
portunity to amend the claims or to contest the Office's finding of obvi-
practiced upon the expiration of the 17-year patent term is viewed as the consideration
given to the public in exchange for the grant of the patent. See Giles S. Rich, The Vague
Concept of "Invention" As Replaced By Sec. 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 855 (1964) (stating that the patent system provides the necessary incentive to bring
forth the efforts of inventors from which society benefits).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring that the claims follow the specification and "particularly
point[ing] out" the "subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention").
8. Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent
Law: Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 675 (1989).
9. General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (stating
that the claims "'measure the invention"' to protect the patentee, encourage the inventive
genius of others, and assure that the invention will ultimately be dedicated to the public
(quoting Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419 (1908))).
10. Jerome T. Tao, An Examination of the Federal Circuit's Multi-Tiered Review of
Patent Obviousness, 20 AM. INTELL. PROP. Ass'N Q.J. 84, 85 (1992). The conditions of
novelty and utility are beyond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of novelty and
utility, see DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS §§ 3.01-4.04, at 3-1 to 4-47 (1992).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) states, in relevant part:
A patent may not be obtained...
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made.
Id.
Thus, the determination of nonobviousness involves a comparison of the claims to the
teachings or disclosure of a published reference pre-dating the applicant's invention under
Section 102. The reference is referred to as "prior art," and Section 103 defines the inquiry
that determines whether the distinctions between the claimed invention and the prior art
are sufficient to merit the grant of a patent. Id. § 103.
12. 35 U.S.C §§ 6(a), 103 (1988). The issue of patentability or the validity of the claims
most often involves the inquiry of nonobviousness. See, e.g., Tao, supra note 10, at 85.
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ousness in an attempt to overcome the rejection and obtain a patent
grant.' 3
Once the claims have been approved by the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice and a patent issued for the invention, patent law's second procedural
period can be utilized by the inventor to exclude others from exploiting
the patented invention. This right is enforced through the federal courts
in an action alleging infringement of the patent. 4 If, within the United
States and without authorization, a third party makes, uses, or sells the
invention as it has been defined in the claims, that party is liable to the
patent holder for infringement of the patent.'" The claims of the patent
issued by the Patent and Trademark Office within the first procedural
period provide the definition and scope of the invention used by the court
in determining whether infringement has occurred.' 6 Infringement of the
patent can be found in either of two ways. First, literal infringement may
be found where every recited element or limitation outlined by the claims
is found in the infringing device.' 7 Second, infringement may be found
under the doctrine of equivalents.
The controlling issue for determining infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents is whether the accused infringing device accomplishes sub-
stantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve
substantially the same result as the patented device.'" This doctrine has
been developed in order to prevent an "unscrupulous copyist"' 9 from es-
caping liability for infringement simply by making minor and insubstan-
13. All correspondence between the inventor and the Patent and Trademark Office is
maintained in the application file as the official record. This record is commonly referred
to as the prosecution history or the file wrapper history. See 1 KAYTON, supra note 5, at 2-
1.
14. See id at 1-7 to 1-8.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (stating that "whoever without authority makes, uses or sells
any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent").
16. Adelman & Francione, supra note 8, at 675.
17. See Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967). In patent law,
the device or structure alleged to infringe the patent is often referred to as the "accused"
device. See, e.g., id. Analysis of literal infringement is actually a two-step process that
involves interpretation of the meaning of the claim language and a direct comparison of
the claim to the accused device. Id. at 401.
18. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1950)
(asserting that the doctrine of equivalents exists to protect the inventor from "fraud on a
patent" as limitation of infringement to literal infringement of the claim language would
turn the patent into a "hollow and useless thing").
19. Id. at 607.
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tial substitutions that would take the copied matter outside the scope of
the claim language.2"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit21 has held
that the doctrine of equivalents is to be applied by comparing the claims
and the accused device on an element-by-element basis, with infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents being found only if every element
or function of the claims is matched by an equivalent in the accused de-
vice.22 Notwithstanding this inquiry, recent decisions by the Federal Cir-
cuit show a willingness to soften the rigidity of the element-by-element
analysis.23 One more flexible approach permits "element" to be defined
as either a structural element or limitation or as a series of elements in
the claim.24 Another approach allows a court to find that a claimed in-
vention is a novel or "pioneer" invention, thereby found to be deserving a
broader range of infringing equivalents.25 In their analysis under the doc-
20. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stat-
ing that the doctrine of equivalents evolved from balancing the competing policies of pro-
viding fair notice to the public of the claimed invention and protecting the inventor from
appropriations of the invention that barely avoid the language of the claims).
21. The Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,
96 Stat. 25 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)), and holds virtually exclusive appellate juris-
diction over patent cases. The primary policy reasons for creation of the Federal Circuit
were to relieve the workload of the regional courts of appeals, provide uniformity in patent
law, and to eliminate overlapping functions formerly provided by the Court of Claims and
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeal. CHiSUM, supra note 10, § 11.06[3][e], at 11-209
to 11-211.
22. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (holding that because a single equivalent in the accused device could not be found
for a claim element, there was no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 961, and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988).
23. See, e.g., Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(denying rehearing en banc) (stating that an element-by-element analysis is merely one
possible approach); W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (stating that the doctrine of equivalents "requires a showing that the accused process
performs substantially the same overall function in substantially the same way to obtain
substantially the same overall result").
24. Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(stating that one-to-one correspondence of components between the claim and the infring-
ing device need not be found as elements may be combined without ipso facto loss of
equivalency); Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that "element" can mean either a structural element or limitation
or a "series of limitations" in the claim). This apparent willingness to broaden the limited
element-by-element approach, paired with changes in the composition of the Federal Cir-
cuit, leaves the scope of the element-by-element approach unresolved. 1 KAYToN, supra
note 5, at 2-25 to 2-26 (discussing the views of several individual judges on the Federal
Circuit).
25. See, e.g., Sealed Air Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976, 984
(Fed. Cir. 1981) (stating that a pioneer invention that performs a function never before
performed is entitled to a liberal application of the doctrine of equivalents); see also
[Vol. 43:577
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trine of equivalents, courts often reiterate the equitable nature of the
doctrine, asserting that it prevents piracy of the invention while allowing
subsequent inventors to avoid infringement by designing around the
claims.26 The absence of a clear distinction between an equitable attempt
to design around the claims and piracy has subjected the doctrine of
equivalents to much debate.27
This Comment traces the formation of the Federal Circuit's current
patent validity analysis, focusing on the effect of the statutory require-
ment of nonobviousness over the prior art. This Comment identifies the
problems confronted in defining the analysis, and discusses the objective
criteria that have been utilized since passage of the Patent Act of 1952. It
then surveys the case law surrounding the inventor's right to exclude
others from utilizing the patented invention under the second period of
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (cit-
ing Sealed Air Corp. with approval).
26. See, e.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(stating that the patent system promotes innovation by encouraging others to design
around patent claims); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (declaring that the doctrine of equivalents equitably prevents fraud on the patent);
see also Donald R. Dunner & J. Michael Jakes, The Equitable Doctrine of Equivalents, 75
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 857, 865-69 (1993) (outlining the Federal Circuit's re-
newed emphasis on inequitable conduct by the defendant). But see Gregory J. Smith, The
Federal Circuit's Modern Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Infringement, 29 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 901, 914 (1989) (asserting that equitable concerns regarding the unscrupulous cop-
yist are "overplayed" and have a "decidedly hollow ring"); Harold C. Wegner, Equitable
Equivalents: Weighing the Equities to Determine Patent Infringement in Biotechnology and
Other Emerging Technologies, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 4 (1992) (observing
that the doctrine is often mechanistically applied with only "lip service ... paid to its
equitable origins").
27. See Adelman & Francione, supra note 8, at 682-83 (expressing concern that the
doctrine leads to unpredictable litigation outcomes, expansion of claim scope to the extent
that the claims no longer provide notice to the public, and abusive infringement actions);
Richard M. Klein, Establishing Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents After
Malta, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 5, 6-7 (1993) (stating that a great deal of
ambiguity remains as to the precision required when comparing each element or limitation
in a claim to an accused object). Uncertainty in patent law invites protracted and complex
litigation, the increase of which may hinder technological innovation. See Henrik D.
Parker, Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis After Wilson Sporting Goods: The Hypothetical
Claim Hydra, 18 Am. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N QJ. 262,266 (1990) (recognizing the need to
simplify patent litigation); Nancy Rutter, The Great Patent Plague, FORBES, Mar. 29, 1993,
at 59-66 (detailing complaints that aggressive and costly patent litigation by large compa-
nies stifles entrepreneurship in high-technology fields).
The Federal Circuit, recognizing these problems, has recently ordered sua sponte en
banc hearing of the following issues: (1) whether a finding of infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents requires anything in addition to the tripartite function-way-result test,
and if so what, (2) whether the trial court's application of the doctrine of equivalents is
discretionary, and (3) whether the doctrine of equivalents is an equitable remedy to be
decided by the court or an issue of fact to be decided by the jury. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.
v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., No. 93-1088 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 1993).
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patent law. This Comment further analyzes infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents, and again, identifies the policies that drive the
courts' analysis and the problems of definition. Because the analysis
under both nonobviousness and the doctrine of equivalents focuses on
the difference between the claims and an outside standard, this Comment
compares the requirements of each analysis. This Comment concludes
that the policies and problems of each analysis are analogous and, accord-
ingly, the uncertainties surrounding the current application of the doc-
trine of equivalents should be resolved by increased emphasis on
objective considerations such as the relevant prior art and the pioneering
nature of the claimed invention.
I. OBVIOUSNESS: A COMPARISON OF THE CLAIMS AND THE PRIOR
ART
The determination as to whether an invention is patentable relates to
both procedural periods of patent law. The condition of nonobviousness
necessary for a finding of patentability arises both in the period of pro-
curement, where an inventor asserts to the Patent Office that the inven-
tion is not obvious,28 and also in the enforcement of the patent, where a
defendant in an infringement suit asserts the defense that the patented
claims, although approved by the Patent Office, are obvious and there-
fore invalid.29
A. Case Law Prior to the Patent Act of 1952: The Supreme Court's
Reluctance to Define a Principled and Objective Test
The earliest patent statutes enacted by Congress identified novelty as
the single test for patentability.3" The Act of 1793, for example, provided
that a patent would be issued on any machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter that was "new and useful."'31 In addition, the Act con-
tained a provision denying patentability to small changes in the form or
structure of known devices and compositions.32 The basic elements of
this Act remain valid today, and thus, the essential issue for more than
28. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
29. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 282 (1988) (stating that a plea of patent invalidity because
the claims would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art is a defense to
infringement).
30. See Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents,
1966 Sup. Cr. REV. 293, 303.
31. Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (repealed 1836).
32. Section 2 of the Act stated that "simply changing the form or the proportions of
any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a discovery."
§ 2, 1 Stat. at 321. Accord Kitch, supra note 30, at 318.
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two hundred years has been whether a novel invention is sufficiently dis-
tinct from the prior art to warrant patentability.
33
Under this statutory background, in the mid-nineteenth century the
United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Hotchkiss v. Green-
wood.' Hotchkiss involved a plaintiff who brought suit alleging that his
patent was infringed upon by the defendant.35 The patented invention at
issue was a doorknob attached to a shank device, with the claimed im-
provement consisting of a knob made of clay or porcelain instead of the
conventionally used metal.36 Greenwood, who was alleged to have vio-
lated the patent, asserted in defense that the patent was void because the
only change over the prior art was the use of porcelain instead of metal.37
In its opinion, the Court declared that in order to be patentable, the in-
vention must illustrate a level of skill surpassing that of the ordinary per-
son in that particular field.38 Finding that the application of the well-
known shank-to-knob fastening configuration to porcelain instead of
metal did not show the requisite level of skill required for patentability,
the Court held the patent to be invalid and thus not infringed.39
While Hotchkiss is widely recognized as the foundation for the current
legal analysis of nonobviousness,4 following the Court's opinion the
question of what differences between a claimed device and the prior art
were sufficient for patentability was far from settled. In Smith v. Nich-
ols,4 the Court again examined the issue of what differences are consid-
ered a sufficient advance from the prior art to merit patentability. a2 In
Nichols, the plaintiff patented an improved fabric made by incorporating
longitudinal elastic threads in a stretched position with a weave of threads
passing over and under the stretched elastic.43 Upon completion of the
weaving process, the elastic released back to the unstretched position
providing for a stronger, more tightly woven fabric." The plaintiff sought
to prevent the defendant from using the patented fabric; in response, the
33. ROBERT A. CHOATE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 304 (1987).
34. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
35. Id. at 249-50.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 257.
38. Id. at 267. The Court stated that a patentable invention required "more ingenuity
and skill .. . than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business."
Id.
39. Id. at 265, 267.
40. See CHiSuM, supra note 10, § 5.02[1], at 5-10.
41. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 112 (1875).
42. Id. at 117.
43. Id. at 116.
44. Id.
1994]
Catholic University Law Review
defendant argued that the patent was invalid for lack of novelty. 45 The
Court noted that a fabric of virtually the same construction as that pat-
ented was publicly used before the plaintiff's invention, but with inferior
qualities of tightness and beauty.46 In spite of these advances in quality,
the Court declared that "a change only in form, proportions, or degree,
the substitution of equivalents, doing substantially the same thing in the
same way by substantially the same means with better results, is not such
invention as will sustain a patent. '4 7 Applying this rule, the Court found
that the difference or improvement of the patented fabric over the prior
art was merely one of degree and, therefore, the patent was invalid.4"
Reflecting the analysis of the level of skill in the relevant field articulated
in Hotchkiss, the Court stated that a patentable invention was "a mental
result, ''49 suggesting that the focus of its analysis was shifting from the
invention per se to the inventor's mental process in conceiving the
invention.50
In spite of the Court's ruling in Nichols, patent law continued to lack
an exclusive or even principled analysis of what distinctions over the prior
art were patentable.5' In Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co.,52 the
defendant in a patent infringement suit again raised the defense that the
patent was invalid for lack of novelty.53 The patent at issue claimed an
improvement in artificial teeth by using a supporting plate of vulcanized
rubber instead of gold plates to support the teeth.54 The Supreme Court
examined the issue of whether the patent was invalid because the claims
were merely the substitution of hard rubber for the same use, in substan-
tially the same manner, and with the same effect of substances previously
45. Id. at 117.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 119. One cannot help but wonder if the Court, resolving the issue of validity,
envisioned analysis of a patent's validity and infringement under similar standards by ex-
pressly referring to a "substitution of equivalents, doing substantially the same thing in the
same way by substantially the same means with better results." Id.; see also Machine Co. v.
Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 124 (1878) (holding that a device will infringe a patent where it
performs "substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
result"); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 344 (1854) (holding on the issue of
infringement, that a mere change in form from patentee's invention so as to use substan-
tially the same mode of operation to achieve the same kind of result constituted infringe-
ment). The use of identical language in addressing the issues of validity and infringement
shows the Court's implicit recognition that the issues are analogous.
48. Smith, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 119.
49. Id. at 118.
50. Kitch, supra note 30, at 318.
51. Id. at 319.
52. 93 U.S. 486 (1877).
53. Id. at 489.
54. Id. at 490.
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used in manufacturing artificial teeth.5- Such a substitution, the Court
stated, would amount to "no invention. '56 The Court noted that setting
the teeth in the rubber while it was in a plastic condition formed a unitary
piece, having the benefits of better fit, lighter weight, and sufficient flexi-
bility and strength.57 On this basis, the Court held that the patent was not
a mere substitution, but was "in truth, invention.",58 Thus, the Court sig-
nalled that the presence or absence of "invention" was the ultimate issue
upon which validity of a patent would turn.59
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Goodyear Dental, courts ap-
plied the invention requirement of patentability on a case-by-case basis.'
The problem inherent in defining invention was admitted, and general
criteria for such a test were rejected.61 Most often, the requirement of
invention or novelty was merged with the requirement of nonobviousness
set forth in Hotchkiss.62
Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.63 represented a
further attempt by the Supreme Court to articulate what advances in the
art warrant patentability. The patented device at issue in Cuno Engineer-
ing was a wireless, removable cigarette lighter for automobiles, designed
55. Id. at 492.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 493-95.
58. Id. at 495.
59. CHISUM, supra note 10, § 5.02[1], at 5-13 (outlining the historical development of
patent law in the late nineteenth century).
60. See, e.g., Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 72 (1885) (hold-
ing a patent invalid because the claimed invention did not "spring from that intuitive
faculty of the mind put forth in the search for new results or new methods, creating what
had not before existed"); Vulcan Corp. v. Slipper City Wood Heel Co., 89 F.2d 109, 110
(6th Cir. 1937) (holding a patent invalid because the invention was not the result of "some
flash of genius, inspiration, or imagination"); United Chromium, Inc. v. International Sil-
ver Co., 53 F.2d 390, 393 (D. Conn. 1931) (holding a patent invalid and stating that
"[p]atentable novelty" was found in discovering the difficulty of an existing structure and
correcting that difficulty), modified, 60 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 600
(1933); Pyrene Mfg. Co. v. Boyce, 292 F. 480, 481 (3d Cir.) (defining "[i]nvention" as "a
concept; a thing evolved from the mind" that is "the creation of something which did not
exist before"), cert denied, 263 U.S. 723 (1923).
61. See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891) (stating that "whether the vari-
ation relied upon in a particular case is anything more than ordinary mechanical skill is a
question which cannot be answered by applying the test of any general definition"); Sachs
v. Hartford Elec. Supply Co., 47 F.2d 743, 748 (2d Cir. 1931) (stating that "[s]uch a stan-
dard is no more of a will-o'-the-wisp than others which the law adopts .... Any attempt to
define it in general terms has always proved illusory; it is best to abandon it."). Judge
Learned Hand would later comment that the concept of "invention" is "as fugitive, impal-
pable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal con-
cepts." Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950).
62. Kitch, supra note 30, at 323.
63. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
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to operate so that the igniter was heated when placed in position.64 Upon
reaching the proper temperature, a thermostatic control caused a spring
to automatically return the igniter to the off position, leaving the lighter
ready for use.65 Previously, cigarette lighters required the driver to hold
the igniter in the on position until he observed or guessed that the tem-
perature was sufficiently hot.66
Articulating the rule that a patentable device must reveal a "flash of
creative genius,"'67 the Court held that the well-known use of thermo-
static controls to provide automatic temperature control for electric heat-
ers, irons, coffee makers, bread toasters, and nonremovable cigarette
lighters rendered the patent invalid.6" The Court further urged that the
flash of creative genius test be applied strictly to mitigate against a find-
ing of patentability.
69
B. The Patent Act of 1952: Congressional Response to Cuno
Engineering
Patent law was thrown into a state of turmoil following Cuno Engineer-
ing, as practitioners struggled to define the requirements of creative
flashes of genius.70 Rather than clarifying the law, the Supreme Court's
64. Id. at 86.
65. Id. at 86-87.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 91. Justice Douglas declared that "the new device, however useful it may be,
must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has
not established its right to a private grant on the public domain." Id.
68. Id. at 88-89.
69. Justice Douglas' hostility towards patents representing small deviations from
known technology is evident in the following passage:
Strict application of that test is necessary lest in the constant demand for new
appliances the heavy hand of tribute be laid on each slight technological advance
in an art. The consequences of the alternative course were forcefully pointed out
by Mr. Justice Bradley in Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200: "Such indis-
criminate creation of exclusive privileges tends to obstruct rather than to stimu-
late invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers who make it their
business to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the
form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the
industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real advancement of
the arts. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears and apprehen-
sions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to lawsuits and vexatious ac-
counting for profits made in good faith."
Id. at 92.
70. Cuno Engineering prompted a flood of commentary by those in the field. See P.J.
Federico, Origins of Section 103, 5 AM. PAT. L. Ass'N Q.J. 87, 97 n.5 (1977) (suggesting
that the "'flash of creative genius"' language of Cuno Engineering was likely a "rhetorical
flourish," but, coupled with the resulting commentary, led to a higher standard of invention
in the lower courts). Indeed, practitioners attempted to either explain the holding or advo-
cate a more uniform test. See, e.g., Robert S. Allyn, Patentable Yardsticks, 25 J. PAT. OFF.
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holding in Cuno Engineering only aggravated the uncertainty inherent in
Goodyear Dental's test of "invention."'"
In the 1950s, Congress undertook to revise the patent statutes with the
hope of counteracting the perceived effect of Cuno Engineering, seeking
to satisfy the long-felt need for a statutory definition of those changes
from the prior art meriting patentability.72 The result was section 103 of
the Patent Act of 1952."3 Congress' purpose74 in enacting section 103 was
to convey the subjective question of "what is invention?" in as objective
terms as possible.75 The hope was to provide a degree of uniformity to
the determination of patentability, thereby reducing the numerous ap-
Soc'Y 791, 811-13 (1943) (arguing that "flash of creative genius" as used by the Supreme
Court did not change the standard of invention but merely restated the previous standard
in altered words); Otto Raymond Barnett, The "Flash of Genius" Fallacy, 25 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 785, 786-89 (1943) (criticizing the flash of genius test as precluding the results of
reasoned investigation from being eligible for patentability); Aram Boyajian, The Flash of
Creative Genius An Alternative Interpretation, 25 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 776, 776-81 (1943)
(outlining four previous interpretations of Cuno Engineering, and providing a fifth focus-
ing on the creative idea embodied within the device and not the mental process from which
it evolved); William D. Sellers, The Flash of Genius Doctrine Approaches the Patent Office,
26 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 275, 275 (1944) (citing Potts v. Coe, 60 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 226 (1944),
to show that the flash of creative genius test changed the manner in which the Patent
Office determines patentability); S. Spintman, Has the Standard of Invention Been Raised?,
27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 422, 422 (1945) (concluding that the flash of creative genius test had
no effect on the manner in which the Patent Office determines patentability and that it is in
fact but one of many tests of patentability).
71. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
72. See Federico, supra note 70, at 87 (1977); L. James Harris, Some Aspects of the
Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act of 1952, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658, 674
n.62 (1955); Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 405-06
(1960). The influence of Federico, Harris, and Rich on the drafting of Section 103 is widely
recognized, with Federico credited as the primary author of the statute. See, e.g., Louis S.
Zarfas, Notes from the Editor, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 160 (1993) (quoting S.
J. Crumpacker, Symposium on Patents, 1962 SUMMARY PROC., SEC. PAT., TRADEMARKS &
COPYRIGHT L. 141, 143).
73. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) requires that a patent may not be obtained
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner
in which the invention was made.
Id.
74. For a frank discussion of the significance of congressional intent as it pertains to
section 103, see Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intent-Or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of
1952?, in PATENT PROCUREMENT & EXPLOrrATION 61 (1963) (stating that the only "in-
tent" relevant is that of a subcommittee to pass a bill written by patent lawyers and agreed
to by counsel for the subcommittee and its members), reprinted in JOHN F. WITHERSPOON,
NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 1:1 (1980).
75. Harris, supra note 72, at 675.
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proaches various courts had taken to the issue.76 To this end, the use of
the indefinite term "invention" was omitted, authoritatively requiring
nonobviousness to be the test for patentability.77 In addition, the mode
of analysis for nonobviousness was altered to look to what the hypotheti-
cal person of ordinary skill in the art would have known at the time of the
invention.7" This inquiry represents the touchstone of a principled analy-
sis that is a far cry from the former tests of substantial equivalents, inven-
tion, creative faculty, and creative flashes of genius.79
C. Judicial Response to Section 103: The Emergence
of Objective Criteria
The change section 103 made in the determination of patentability was
not immediately recognized, however, and courts continued to rely on the
old standard of invention after the passage of section 103.80 Debate en-
sued as to whether the new Act merely codified prior case law on the
standard of invention or mandated a different analysis.8 While a change
was intended,82 the new statute was not designed to categorize specific
criteria for patentability in detail, but rather to provide a basis for courts
to later add further criteria to the analysis.83
76. H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952), reprinted in 34 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 549, 557 (1952) (stating that "[t]his section should have a stabilizing effect and mini-
mize great departures which have appeared in some cases").
77. Rich, supra note 72, at 405.
78. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
79. Rich, supra note 72, at 405-06 (asserting that the analysis set forth in section 103
requires the Patent Office and courts to articulate a definite pattern of thinking to justify
validity decisions).
80. See General Radio Co. v. Superior Elec. Co., 321 F.2d 857, 862 (3d Cir. 1963)
(stating that a patentable invention is a new and useful means to achieve a desired result,
and not merely the functions attributed to the means), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); In
re O'Keefe, 202 F.2d 767, 771 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (stating that the Patent Act of 1952 neither
lowered, nor raised the standard of invention); New Wrinkle, Inc. v. Watson, 206 F.2d 421,
422 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (stating that because "non-invention" was so "clear" in that case
there was no need to determine the scope of the analysis required by section 103).
81. See Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530, 535 (2d Cir.) (raising the
issue of whether section 103 changed the previous standard for patentability and holding in
the affirmative), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 911 (1955). For a criticism of Lyon, see Vermont
Structural Slate Co. v. Tatko Bros. Slate Co., 233 F.2d 9, 11 n.3 (2d Cir.) (citing holdings of
other circuits to show that section 103 merely codified the prior standard), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 917 (1956).
82. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
83. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 1954),
reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 161, 184 (1993) (discussing the effects
that section 103 was intended to have on the standard of patentability).
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The addition of further analytical criteria finally came from the
Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.8 4 In Graham, the Court
held that the issue of nonobviousness under section 103 was determined
by a three-part factual inquiry.85 Under this inquiry, the scope and con-
tent of the prior art are first determined. Second, the differences be-
tween the prior art and the claims at issue are ascertained; and third, the
level of skill in the pertinent art is resolved.' The facts developed under
the three-part inquiry determine whether the claims would have been ob-
vious to one of ordinary skill in the art. 87
Applying this analysis to the facts in Graham, the claims at issue de-
fined a chisel plow constructed so that the chisel of the plow would raise
out of the ground upon contact with impediments such as heavy rocks,
thereby avoiding breakage.8" The chisel of the plow was in the shape of a
fishhook, with the shank attached to the topside of a hinged plate. 9 The
fulcrum of the hinged plate was attached to an upper plate and the for-
ward end was held against the upper plate with a heavy spring.90 This
arrangement was similar to devices in the prior art except that in the prior
art, the shank of the chisel plow was attached to the underside of the
hinged plate with an additional bracket holding the two parts in contact.91
The additional bracket served to distribute evenly the stress caused by a
rock along the length of the shank rather than only that portion of the
shank in contact with the hinged plate.92
Having considered both the scope of the prior art and the difference
between the prior art and the claims, the Court noted that the bracket of
the prior art served the same function as the claimed improvement of
attaching the shank to the topside of the hinged plate, that is, distributing
stress evenly along the length of the shank. 93 The Court accepted this as
a showing that one of ordinary skill in the art could recognize that the
plow was more effective with an even distribution of stress.94 The Court
held, upon completion of the three-part inquiry, that the modification of
84. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
85. Id. at 17.
86. Id.
87. Id. The Court further specified that objective facts, such as the commercial success
of the invention, the long felt need in the relevant art, and the failure of others to success-
fully complete the invention, may be used as secondary indicia of nonobviousness. Id. at
17-18.
88. Id. at 19-20.
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 22-23.
92. Id. at 23.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 24-25.
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inverting the shank and the hinged plate would have been obvious, and
declared the claims invalid.95
Section 103 was further clarified in ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Mon-
tefiore Hospital.96 In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether evidence of a teaching
or incentive to combine separate prior art references is required to render
a claimed invention obvious.9 7 The plaintiff in the case patented a televi-
sion system for rental use that could be locked in an off position by a key
operator.98 For rental use, the system had an override switch that, when
depressed by the viewer, enabled the television to operate normally with-
out turning on the key operator switch.99 The override switch activated
an indicator signal, thus showing that a person had rented the televi-
sion.' ° The patent owner sued the defendant for infringement of the
claims, and the defendant asserted the patent's invalidity under section
103.101 In applying the Graham analysis, the trial court found that the
difference between the patent claims and the prior art was obvious, stat-
ing that "'the overriding of switches by providing an alternative path for
current to actuate an appliance is a commonly practiced technique well
known in the art.""' The Federal Circuit reversed, ruling that in order
to invalidate a patent, the prior art must teach or motivate one of ordi-
nary skill in the art to combine two known elements to make a new de-
vice.' 0 3 The court noted first that the use of override switches in a wide
variety of applications was not relevant to the claimed subject matter as a
whole-television rental switches.10 4 Because the trial court identified no
source in the prior art for the suggestion of using an override switch in a
rental television, 0 5 the citation of unrelated elements to show obvi-
ousness was improperly the product of hindsight reconstruction of the
claimed subject matter."° The Federal Circuit thereby stressed the im-
portance of another factual finding needed to support a conclusion of
obviousness.0 7
95. Id.
96. 732 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
97. Id. at 1577.




102. Id. (quoting trial court's opinion).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1576.
105. Id. at 1577.
106. Id.
107. See also W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(stating that a prior art reference must convey or suggest knowledge of the invention to
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Throughout the history of the United States patent system, Congress
and the courts have grappled with the problem of defining what changes
in current technology merit patentability."' 8 This task is often a difficult
one, and remains the subject of debate today. However, because the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit"° took the initiative to increase
the focus on objective criteria within the confines of the statutory lan-
guage, the current obviousness standard is a marked improvement over
the subjectivity of the prior tests.110
II. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS: A COMPARISON OF THE CLAIMS
AND THE WORK OF AN ACCUSED INFRINGER
In contrast to the successful use of objective criteria to determine issues
of obviousness, the role of objective criteria in the doctrine of equivalents
remains unsettled. When expanding the scope of the claim language to
embrace equivalent structures in the alleged infringing device, the courts
have neither clearly nor consistently required analysis of the prior art, the
pioneering nature of the patented invention, and direct evidence of copy-
ing by the defendant.
avoid the "insidious effect" of hindsight reconstruction), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984).
The Federal Circuit also has emphasized the role of secondary, objective evidence, as dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) (not-
ing the potential use of commercial success, failure of others to accomplish that which the
claims accomplish, and a long felt need in the art). See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp.,
724 F.2d 951, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (recognizing that the commercial success and teachings
in the prior art that would lead one away from the claimed invention are "highly probative,
objective criteria fully capable of serving as a foundation for the legal conclusion of nonob-
viousness"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717
F.2d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing, as evidence of nonobviousness, the previous unsuc-
cessful efforts of others to solve the problem corrected by the claimed invention, and the
previous belief of experts that the problem could not be solved).
108. See supra notes 30-79 and accompanying text.
109. The analysis of Graham, however, did not provide immediate uniformity. Various
circuits remained hostile to the validity of patents despite the analysis mandated by section
103. See COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCrURE
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195, 370-71
(1975) (the Hruska Commission) (finding that the sparseness of Supreme Court decisions
on the issue of obviousness led to extreme instances of forum shopping where patentees
"'scramble to get into the 5th, 6th, and 7th circuits since the courts there are not inhospita-
ble to patents whereas infringers scramble to get anywhere but in these circuits"' (quoting
Letter from James B. Gambrell and Donald R. Dunner, Commission Patent Law Consul-
tants, to the Hruska Commission)). The findings of the Hruska Commission led to the
formation of the Federal Circuit. See H.R. Rep. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1981)
(quoting the findings of the Hruska Commission).
110. Rich, supra note 72, at 405.
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A. The Tripartite Function-Way-Result Test as Defined in Graver Tank
In Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.,"' the
Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of equivalents applies where the
infringing device performs the same function in substantially the same
way to achieve substantially the same result. 1 2 In Graver Tank, the pat-
entee sued the defendant for infringing upon claims in a patent to a weld-
ing flux containing an alkaline earth metal silicate." 3 The defendant's
flux contained manganese silicate, which is not an alkaline earth metal
silicate and did not literally infringe the claims." 4 Accordingly, the issue
in the case was whether manganese silicate was equivalent to an alkaline
earth metal silicate." 5
The Supreme Court first expanded on the underlying policies of the
doctrine of equivalents." 6 It stated that "imitation of a patented inven-
tion which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the pro-
tection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing" and that
without the doctrine, patent protection analysis would be "at the mercy of
verbalism and would be subordinating substance to form.""' 7 The Court
further noted that the doctrine "is not the prisoner of a formula" but that
an important factor was whether the flux ingredients were known to be
interchangeable by those skilled in the welding art." 8
Applying the tripartite function-way-result test to the facts in Graver
Tank, the Court held the patent to be infringed because the manganese
and alkaline earth metals operated in the same way to achieve the same
result." 9 The Court also noted the art-recognized similarities between
the manganese and alkaline earth metals as evidence that the two had the
111. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
112. Id. at 608.
113. Id. at 606.
114. Id. at 611.
115. The district court held four of the flux claims that were limited to alkaline earth
metal silicates to be valid and infringed. Id. at 606. Claims embracing "'metallic silicates"'
or "'silicates"' were held to be invalid as embracing metals that were inoperative to the
invention. Id. However the specification of the patent disclosed manganese to be opera-
ble. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court regarding the claims held invalid.
Id. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the district court de-
cree. Id. Rehearing was granted, limited to the issue of infringement and the applicability
of the doctrine of equivalents. Id.
116. Id. at 607-10.
117. Id. at 607.
118. Id. at 609.
119. Id. at 611.
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same function in the welding fluxes. 2 On this basis, the Court found the
claims to be infringed.' 2 '
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black argued that wide application of
the doctrine of equivalents would erode the requirement that the claims
particularly point out what the applicant regards as the invention. 122 This
requirement was important, Justice Black stated, in that it serves to place
the public on notice as to what the patent protects.'2 Justice Black con-
cluded by arguing that expansion of the claim's scope through the doc-
trine of equivalents would lead to retroactive infringement actions and
defeat the authority of the Patent Office initially to determine the patent-
able scope of the claims. 24
B. Element by Element Comparison of the Claims and the Accused
Device is Required by the Federal Circuit
Competing interests of prevention of fraud on a patent and notice to
the public as outlined in the majority and dissenting opinions of Graver
Tank provide the background against which all issues under the doctrine
of equivalents are heard.'25 In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
126
the Federal Circuit faced the problem of what may be considered an
equivalent. Hughes Aircraft owned the patent rights to a device that pro-
vided satellites with an improved means for attitude control. 127 The con-
trol system was claimed to have the ability to detect its own position
relative to the sun by means of an on-board sensor, and to transmit the
orientation signal to ground control.'21 The satellite also had the ability
to receive a control signal from the ground, determined in response to the
orientation signal, and could change its position as directed by the ground
control signal.'29 The accused satellite was alleged to be in violation of
120. Id. at 610-11.
121. Id. at 620.
122. Id. at 613 (Black, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 617.
124. Id. at 615.
125. See William E. Eshelman, Comment, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law:
Post-Pennwalt Developments, 65 TUL. L. REv. 883, 884 (1991) (discussing Graver Tank as
the seminal precedent in equivalency issues).
126. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
127. Id. at 1353. "Attitude" refers to the orientation of a spacecraft's spin axis to the
earth. See U.S. Patent 3,758,051, column 11, lines 34-45.
128. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1364.
129. Id. at 1353, 1364. The specific claim language was in the form of means plus func-
tion limitations provided for by 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). In interpreting such language, the
patent specification limits the claim language as to what structure literally infringes the
claim. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 961, and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988). If the accused device performs
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Hughes' patent, but had a system for attitude control that differed from
Hughes' patent claims by processing the orientation signal through an on-
board computer, rather than processing the signal through ground con-
trol.13 0 The on-board computer then activated a jet for proper position-
ing of the satellite.
131
The district court held that the doctrine of equivalents did not apply
because there was no obvious and exact equivalent in the accused satel-
lite for the claimed ability to send the orientation signal to ground control
or the ability to receive a control signal to activate the jet.' 32 The court
compared Hughes' patent claims to the prior art.' 33 The court stated that
the claims at issue did not represent a "pioneer"'134 invention because the
prior art taught the basic principle of adjusting a satellite position by
pulsed jet propulsion. 35 Therefore, the range of possible equivalents was
considerably narrowed. 36
The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that the claimed invention must
be considered as a whole when applying the doctrine of equivalents.'
37
Thus, the trial court erred by requiring an obvious and exact equivalent
for the satellite's ability to send and receive signals.' 38 The appellate
court's opinion noted that demanding an equivalent for each element in
the claims be found in the accused device is a requirement of literal in-
fringement.' 39 The court found that the on-board computer-technology
not available at the time the claims were patented°40-achieved the same
function in substantially the same way to achieve the same result as the
control system of the patented satellite. 4 '
The effect of the requirement of Hughes Aircraft-that the claimed in-
vention be considered as a whole-was reconsidered by the Federal Cir-
the same function with a structure that is different from but equivalent to that of the speci-
fication, then literal infringement is found. Id.
130. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1364.
131. Id. at 1360-61.
132. Id. at 1364.
133. Id. at 1362.
134. A "pioneer" invention is entitled to a wide range of equivalents. Coming Glass
Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 374 F.2d 473, 476 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
826 (1967).
135. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1362.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1364.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. The fact that an accused device incorporates an improvement on the claimed de-
vice is not sufficient to preclude application of the doctrine of equivalents. Morley Sewing
Mach. Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 273 (1889).
141. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1363, 1365.
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cuit in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.1 42  In that case, the
patentee brought suit alleging patent infringement on claims for a fruit
sorter.143 The claimed machine sorted fruit according to color and
weight. 44 As a piece of fruit passed through the sorter, its location was
continuously recorded by a position-indicating mechanism. 45 The ac-
cused sorter had no equivalent means for continuously tracking and stor-
ing the position of each piece of fruit, but rather used a software queue
for sorting.' 46 The district court held that the accused sorter had no com-
ponents that performed a function within the range of equivalents for the
position-indicating mechanism.
147
The Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court in finding that the accused
sorter had no equivalent for the claimed continuous position-indication
mechanism.' 48  The majority applied an element-by-element analysis
without considering the claim as a whole.' 49 The majority first noted the
testimony of the plaintiff's witness that the accused sorter "could" be
used to track the position of the fruit.' 50  As to the substitution of
software and a computer in the accused device for the hard wired compo-
nents of the claims, the majority did not find the claimed function of con-
tinuous position tracking in the software of the accused device.' 5 '
Therefore, no equivalent for the continuous position indicating element
could be found.' 52 The majority also noted that the position indicating
mechanism limitation was inserted to overcome a prior art rejection
142. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961, and cert. denied,
485 U.S. 1009 (1988).
143. Id. at 932-33.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 934.
147. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand Wayland, Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 558, 572 (N.D. Ga.
1984), affd in part, vacated in part, 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 961, and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988).
148. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 938.
149. Id. at 935. Judges Bennett and Newman criticized the majority for failing to dis-
cuss or distinguish the precedent requiring consideration of the claim as a whole. Id. at
939, 954-55 (Bennett & Newman, JJ., dissenting). Judge Nies responded by asserting that
the majority holding did not overturn Hughes Aircraft, but rather applied the "all elements
rule." Id. at 949 (Nies, J., additional views). The "all elements rule" is a universal rule of
claim construction requiring a finding of no infringement when a claim limitation is not
present in the accused device either literally or equivalently. Id. Judge Nies maintained
that this rule was in fact applied in Hughes Aircraft, although not expressly stated therein,
thus making the majority holding in fact consistent with Hughes Aircraft. Id.
150. Id. at 937 (majority opinion).
151. Id. at 938-39.
152. Id.
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made by the Patent Office, and thus the doctrine of "file wrapper estop-
pel" prevented plaintiff's effort to avoid this limitation.1
3
The dissent argued that the majority erroneously refused to consider
the claimed invention as a whole, thereby reducing the doctrine of
equivalents to a redundant literal infringement analysis. 54 According to
the dissent, considering the claim as a whole resulted in finding an in-
fringement because the claimed invention stored the fruits' position using
shift registers, while the accused device stored the same data with a com-
bination of queues and pointers.'55 The dissent, therefore, considered the
issue of file wrapper estoppel irrelevant because the accused device, con-
sidered as a whole, had the equivalent of the patent's disclosed position
indicating means.' 56
C. Pioneering Inventions and the Prior Art: The Use of Objective
Criteria in the Doctrine of Equivalents
The Federal Circuit's decision in Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo
Electric U.S.A., Inc.157 represents an important modification to
Pennwalt's mandated element-by-element analysis. In Coming Glass, the
plaintiff alleged infringement of claims to an optical fiber having a core




The core was surrounded by a cladding layer of fused silica which option-
ally contained a dopant. 59 The dopant increased the refractive index of
the core relative to the cladding layer and was therefore known as a posi-
tive dopant.' 60 Using the positive dopant to increase the refractive index
of the core drastically improved the distance that the fibers transmitted
light, thereby allowing the first-ever use of the fibers in optical
communications. 6'
At issue in the case was whether an optical fiber using a negative do-
pant in the cladding to decrease the refractive index of the cladding layer
153. Id. at 938. File wrapper estoppel prevents the patentee from reclaiming, through
the doctrine of equivalents, what was willfully surrendered before the Patent Office
through a limiting argument or amendment to obtain the patent. See, e.g., Exhibit Supply
Corp. v. Ace Patents Co., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942) (holding that an amendment to the
claims to avoid a rejection based on the prior art limits the application of the doctrine of
equivalents).
154. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 940 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 944.
156. Id.
157. 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
158. Id. at 1255.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1254.
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relative to the core infringed upon the claimed optical fiber under the
doctrine of equivalents. 162 The court first noted that disclosure of the
claimed invention created enormous interest in the fiber optics industry,
was the subject of many articles, and earned the inventors numerous
awards and honors.163 The fibers achieved worldwide commercial success
by solving the problem of long distance light transmission that had frus-
trated researchers for over a decade."6 These facts led the lower court to
give the claimed invention pioneer status.1 65 The court then explained
that the element-by-element analysis under the doctrine of equivalents
permits several claim limitations to be combined in a single element of
the accused device.166 Because the combination of a negative dopant in
the cladding layer and no dopant in the core was equivalent to the
claimed limitation that the core have a refractive index above that in the
cladding layer, the accused device was held to infringe the claims under
the doctrine of equivalents.1 67
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates168 illus-
trates another objective analysis the Federal Circuit has applied under the
doctrine of equivalents. The case involved a golf ball patented by Wilson
Sporting Goods, and having a certain geometric configuration of dimples
on the surface of the ball that increased flight distance.'69 The dimples
were arranged so that when six imaginary lines, referred to as "great cir-
cles," are drawn across the widest part of the ball through the midpoints
of twenty imaginary icosahedral triangles, no dimples intersected the six
great circles.' 70 The result was a ball having six axes of symmetry instead
of one.' 7 ' Wilson sued for infringement, alleging that the defendant sold
golf balls that also had dimples arranged in an icosahedral pattern with
162. Id. at 1259.
163. Id. at 1255.
164. Id. at 1255-56.
165. Id. at 1255. A "pioneer invention" is entitled to a broader range of equivalents
than nonpioneering inventions. Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 863 F.2d 855,
861 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1068 (1989). Aside from commercial suc-
cess and impact on the industry, the courts also consider the relative sparseness of prior art
relating to the invention and whether a claimed invention provides a function never before
provided. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 846 F.2d 1369,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (denying rehearing en banc) (stating that the scope of the claims is
determined in light of the patentee's disclosure, the prosecution history, and the prior art);
LaSalle v. Carlton's Laydown Serv., Inc., 680 F.2d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that a
pioneer patent performs a function never performed before).
166. Corning Glass, 868 F.2d at 1259 n.6.
167. Id. at 1260-61.
168. 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990).
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six great circles. The great circles on the accused golf balls, however,
were not dimple-free as the claims at issue literally required. 72 In the
absence of literal infringement, the issue became whether there was in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
173
The evidence showed that the accused balls had sixty dimples that in-
tersected the great circles by up to nine thousandths of an inch. 74 In its
analysis under the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit applied the
tripartite function-way-result test of Graver Tank.'75 However, the court
conditioned application of the doctrine of equivalents on the caveat that
the scope of equivalency of what is literally claimed cannot embrace the
prior art at the time of patentee's invention.176 Comparing the accused
ball to the prior art, the court first created a hypothetical claim of suffi-
cient breadth so that the accused ball would literally infringe the hypo-
thetical claim.' 77  Finding the hypothetical claim to permit dimple
intersection of thirteen percent or less when stated as a percentage of
dimple radius, the court compared the hypothetical claim to prior art golf
balls having dimple intersections of seventeen to twenty-one percent.'
78
The court further noted that the hypothetical claim would recite the pres-
ence of less than sixty intersecting dimples, while the prior art ball had
thirty intersecting dimples. 179 Holding the difference between the prior
art and the hypothetical claim to be so slight as to render the hypothetical
claim as a whole obvious, the application of the doctrine of equivalents
was held to be improper.1
8 0
Review of the doctrine of equivalents in infringement cases reveals
courts' unwillingness to consistently require evidence beyond the func-
tion-way-result test in defining an equivalent. This reluctance is analo-
gous to courts' refusal, before 1952, to define the standards controlling
172. Id.
173. Id. at 683.
174. Id. at 685.
175. 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950); see supra notes 111-21 and accompanying text (discussing
Graver Tank and the function-way-result test).
176. Wilson, 904 F.2d at 683. The issue of whether the range of equivalents would
cover what is already in the public domain is one of law, thereby allowing the Federal
Circuit to apply a de novo standard of review. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d
861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
177. Wilson, 904 F.2d at 685.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. The Federal Circuit later noted that a hypothetical claim analysis is not re-
quired in every application of the doctrine of equivalents, but is merely a tool that helps
define the limits imposed by the prior art on the range of equivalents. Key Mfg. Group,
Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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what changes in the prior art deserved the grant of a patent. 81 Compari-
son of the standard of obviousness and the doctrine of equivalents shows
that the two address similar problems having similar definitional difficul-
ties. 82 This comparison shows that application of the doctrine of
equivalents should be clarified by focusing on objective criteria in a man-
ner similar to the analysis of obviousness developed subsequent to the
Patent Act of 1952.
III. NONOBVIOUSNESS AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS: How
SIMILAR ARE THEY?
A. The Initial Question
Analysis of the nonobviousness aspect of a claim's validity necessarily
requires a comparison of the claim to an outside standard in the prior
art.'8 3 Furthermore, application of the doctrine of equivalents requires a
comparison of the claim to an outside standard-in this instance, the ac-
cused device.'" For over a century, courts have wrestled with the
problems of each analysis, stating in clear terms what distinctions be-
tween a claim and the prior art merit patentability.85 and what distinc-
tions between a claim and an accused device are sufficiently insignificant
to represent an equivalent. 186
The analysis applied to answer questions of patentability first evolved
through standards of "substitutions of equivalents,"'
87 "invention,"'' 8
and "creative flashes of genius"' 89 before the current standard of nonob-
viousness was definitively set forth. Throughout the period preceding the
181. See supra note 61 (reviewing statements by the courts at the turn of the century on
the perceived impossibility of defining invention).
182. See infra notes 183-201 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 11 (stating the requirements found in 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988)).
184. See supra notes 111-21 and accompanying text (explaining the function-way-result
test of Graver Tank).
185. See generally supra notes 34-110 and accompanying text (tracing the historical de-
velopment of nonobviousness).
186. See generally supra notes 111-80 and accompanying text (reviewing the various
tests used in determining the range of equivalents for a claim).
187. Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S, (21 Wall.) 112, 119 (1875) (holding that a new device that
functions in the same way to achieve the same results as a device in the prior art does not
merit patentability); see also supra note 47 and accompanying text (comparing the use of
equivalents analysis to determine validity and infringement issues).
188. Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 493-95 (1877) (holding that
patentability rested on whether a device was found to represent a true invention); see also
supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text (reciting the facts and holding of Goodyear).
189. See Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) (indicat-
ing that a device must result from a "flash of genius" to merit patentability); see also supra
notes 70-71 and accompanying text (detailing the confusion in patent law resulting from
Cuno Engineering).
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Patent Act of 1952, courts reiterated the difficulty in outlining a definite
test to be applied in all situations to all technologies."
In contrast, the basic doctrine of equivalents analysis has deviated little
in the last century from the test of whether the accused device performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve
the same result (the function-way-result test).' 9' Despite arguments that
the current analytical framework creates uncertainty in patent law,
192
courts view the doctrine as equitable and not properly subject to unspar-
ing logic at the expense of justice.193 While several judges on the Federal
Circuit recognize the uncertainty inherent in the doctrine and suggest
limiting its application, 94 courts' reluctance to articulate a meaningful
definitional limitation is reminiscent of the judicial reluctance to define
the standard of invention prior to the Patent Act of 1952.195
The fact that the doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine is not
to say it is a doctrine without principled subsets of analysis. The doctrine
190. See, e.g., McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891) (stating that "whether the
variation relied upon in a particular case is anything more than ordinary mechanical skill is
a question which cannot be answered by applying the test of any general definition"); Har-
ries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950) (noting that the concept of
invention is "as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the para-
phernalia of legal concepts").
191. Compare Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609
(1950) (stating that infringement occurs where the accused device performs substantially
the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result) with Machine
Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1878) (stating that infringement occurs where the accused
device performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the
same result).
192. See, e.g., DALE S. LAZAR, INFRINGEMENT CONCEPTS 114 (1992) (stating that the
debate over balancing the public's right to notice of the invention and the inventor's right
to secure protection of the patent remains unresolved); Adelman & Francione, supra note
8, at 728-29 (urging that the doctrine be buried except to the extent no other doctrine is
available); Eshelman, supra note 125, at 909 (stating that the real issue is simply what
constitutes an equivalent).
193. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l 'rade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that an inventor is entitled to a fair scope of claim language to
prevent fraud on the patent).
194. See Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(advocating "careful confinement" of the doctrine of equivalents to its equitable rule to
promote certainty and clarity in patent law); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d
1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that application of the doctrine of equivalents should
be the exception and not the rule).
195. Compare Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (stating that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be a "prisoner of a formula") with
McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891) (stating that the issue of whether an inven-
tion is anything more than ordinary skill, and therefore patentable, "is a question which
cannot be answered by applying the test of any general definition").
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can be limited by file wrapper estoppel,' 19 and at times is subject to a
hypothetical claim analysis."9 However, problems of uncertainty remain
when a court chooses to distinguish between pioneering and nonpioneer-
ing inventions, but fails to identify to what extent the scope of the claims
may be broadened in the case of a pioneering invention. 19 Uncertainty
also arises when a court's equitable discretion must determine whether a
series of claim elements will require an element-by-element analysis miti-
gating against infringement, or whether the same series of claim elements
can be considered a single element in the search for an equivalent.' 99 In
relying on the equitable nature of the doctrine of equivalents and the
selective application of various limitations, some well defined and others
not, the Federal Circuit is essentially balancing the interests outlined by
the Graver Tank majority and dissent.2" Perhaps this is why application
196. See supra note 153 (explaining that file wrapper estoppel prevents the patentee
from recapturing exclusive rights to an embodiment that were willfully surrendered before
the Patent Office).
197. See supra note 168-80 and accompanying text (reviewing the application and pur-
poses of the hypothetical claim analysis).
198. See supra note 165 (listing criteria that may identify a pioneering invention).
199. See Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that a series of claim limitations may correspond to a single ele-
ment in the accused device); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 949
n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Nies, J., additional views) (stating that one to one correspondence
between claim elements and the accused device is not required when applying the doctrine
of equivalents), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961, and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988).
200. 339 U.S. 605 (1950). Not that such a balancing test has been especially instructive.
See Smith, supra note 26, at 914; Wegner supra note 26, at 4. Despite the Federal Circuit's
affirmations of the equitable nature of the doctrine, courts seldom relate the particular
facts of a case to the opposing interests of this balancing test. See, e.g., Valmont Indus. v.
Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1044-45 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reversing district court's finding
of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents while referring to the "unscrupulous
copyist," but not discussing the presence or absence of evidence showing whether willful
copying occurred); Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 989-90 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (balancing fraud on patent against the public's right of reliance on the claim
language, and holding that the jury could have reasonably found infringement by the func-
tion-way-result test where the record contained no evidence of fraud or copying by
defendant).
Despite continuous references to fraud and copying, no relationship exists between the
"unscrupulous copyist" and willful infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988). See
Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457-59 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reversing the
district court's finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and remanding
the issue of enhanced damages for willful infringement because the previous finding re-
garding equivalents "certainly" influenced the trial court's findings on willful infringe-
ment); Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 275, 277-78 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(finding infringement where defendant's former employee testified that he had knowledge
of the patent and made minimal changes to avoid infringement while maintaining the same
function, but reversing the district court's enhancement of damages for willful infringement
because designing around a patent to avoid infringement is a benefit to the patent system).
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of the same tripartite test to issues of validity"' was rejected by thecourts and by the Patent Act of 1952.
B. The Current Focus of Each Analysis
Using section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 as its analytical basis, the
Supreme Court formulated a principled approach to validity issues focus-
ing on factual considerations such as (i) the scope of the prior art, (ii) a
determination of the differences between the prior art and the claim, and
(iii) an ascertainment of the level of skill of one of ordinary skill in the
art.2 ' 2 The Federal Circuit, when assessing the issue of nonobviousness,
has further utilized objective criteria in requiring a motivational teaching
or suggestion to modify the prior art and consideration of objective crite-
ria in the analysis.20 3 Thus, the focus of this analysis centers on the hypo-
thetical person having ordinary skill in the art, and what the prior art
would have suggested to that person.2°4 It is an attempt to quantify this
person's knowledge and skill to the extent possible, thereby rewarding
innovation surpassing the ordinary level of knowledge and skill through a
patent grant. 20 5 As Congress made clear, the claimed invention must be
considered as a whole without exception in the comparison of the claim
and the prior art.2°
In contrast, the current analysis under the doctrine of equivalents is (i)
a determination of the scope of the claims at issue, (ii) an ascertainment
of the differences between the claim and the accused infringing device,
and (iii) application of the tripartite function-way-result test set forth in
Graver Tank.207 The function-way-result test compares the claim to the
accused device itself, not the hypothetical person's knowledge or skill.20 8
However, the divergence of analysis between nonobviousness and the
doctrine of equivalents in considering claims on an element-by-element
basis or as a whole, is less reasoned. Section 103 requires consideration
of the claims and the invention as a whole in all cases.20 9 Conversely, the
201. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's ref-
erence to the function-way-result test in determining the validity of a patent in Smith v.
Nichols, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 112 (1875)).
202. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
203. ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see supra
note 107 (discussing the Federal Circuit's emphasis on secondary considerations of
obviousness).
204. See supra notes 84-107 and accompanying text.
205. See Rich, supra note 72, at 399, 406.
206. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
207. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
208. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
209. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1984).
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current state of analysis under the doctrine of equivalents mandates an
element-by-element comparison of the claim and the accused device, fo-
cusing only on their differences in the search for an equivalent.210 This
rule is softened by the willingness of the Federal Circuit to consider a
claim "'element"' to embrace a single limitation or a series of
limitations.211
Furthermore, statements by the Federal Circuit that the "as a whole"
rule articulated in Hughes Aircraft has not been overruled also cast doubt
on the certainty of the element-by-element comparison.212 The net result
is that the Federal Circuit may at times refuse to find infringement under
the doctrine because a single claimed element has no direct equivalent in
the accused device.213 In other instances, however, it will consider the
equivalent for a series of claim limitations to be present in a single com-
ponent of the accused device. 214 This is a marked departure from section
103 analysis, which requires consideration of the claim as a whole at all
times.21 5 The doctrine of equivalents also allows for the application of
secondary tests, such as whether the invention represents a pioneering
invention,216 or whether a hypothetical claim of expanded scope might
have been patentable over the prior art.217 These secondary tests force
discussion of objective facts and may be viewed as equitable in nature.
However, their application is selective,21 ' doing little to illuminate a con-
sistent approach to meeting the goals of preventing fraud on the patent
and using the claim language to provide fair notice to the public.219 In-
deed, courts rarely consider a focus on the mens rea of the accused in-
fringer. 220 This balancing, in the absence of evidence of copying by the
210. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961, and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988). See generally supra notes
142-53 and accompanying text.
211. Coming Glass v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
212. Id.; Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 949 (Nies, J., additional views).
213. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 939.
214. See Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
Corning Glass, 868 F.2d 1251, 1259.
215. Rich, supra note 72, at 405-06.
216. See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 168-80 and accompanying text.
218. Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stat-
ing that the hypothetical claim analysis is not required in every application of the doctrine
of equivalents).
219. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. V. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
220. See supra note 200 (exemplifying the Federal Circuit's repeated references to the
unscrupulous copyist in the absence of evidence proving or disproving the presence of such
a fraud). Where courts, using an equity balancing approach, do not use a factual inquiry in
determining whether "copying" has taken place, the result is likely derived from a judge's
19941
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defendant, results in an ad hoc approach to cases where the outcome of
the Graver Tank test is often rationalized by conclusory statements that
the accused device does or does not operate "in substantially the same
way" as required by the test.221
C. A Proposal to Identify a Consistent Policy Regarding Equivalents
and a Test to Further that Policy
The Patent Act of 1952 provided the basis for an ordered analysis to be
applied uniformly with the expectation that the courts would provide ad-
ditional criteria as time progressed 2 2 Despite section 103's shortcom-
221ings,  it directly speaks to the policy of denying patentability to
insubstantial changes in the prior art,224 and is a significant improvement
individualized notions of which interest is generally more important, an inventor's interest
in gaining extended protection for an invention, or the public's right to fair notice as to
what technology may be freely used without the threat of a lawsuit alleging patent infringe-
ment. See Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 959 F.2d 923, 923 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (New-
man, J., dissenting) (stating that the current interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents
will continue to depend on the selection of the panel), denying reh'g en banc to Malta v.
Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that where paten-
tee failed to explain why the function, way, and result of accused device was the same as
that claimed, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents could not be found); see also 1
PATRICK G. BURNS ET AL., "DESIGNING AROUND" VALID U.S. PATENTS 3-29 to 3-31
(1993) (asserting that the outcome of a close case under the doctrine of equivalents may
depend on which panel of the Federal Circuit is hearing the case).
221. Slimfold Mfg. v. Kinkead Indus., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis
deleted) (recognizing that the critical issue when applying the function-way-result test most
often turns on whether the devices work in the same "way" and that the function and
results of a device are easier to ascertain); see also Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med
Mfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that an accused cervical collar having
rigid support that extended beyond the front and rear portions instead of only at these
portions, as claimed, achieved "better result[s] in a different way"). The issue is further
complicated by the Federal Circuit's recognition that designing around patents promotes
progress and is therefore desirable conduct to be encouraged. Slimfold, 932 F.2d at 1457.
On the other hand, "fraud" is synonymous with dishonesty and bad faith. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, it is difficult to see how one seeking to design
around a patent can, consistent with the goals of the patent system, be accused of "fraud"
or "bad faith."
222. See generally supra notes 84-107 and accompanying text (reviewing trends in the
standard of nonobviousness since the passage of the Patent Act of 1952).
223. See Martin J. Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 979, 991 (1987) (stating that the Federal
Circuit's holdings on nonobviousness have been unpredictable, supported by no articula-
tion of policy); Chris P. Konkol, A Critique of the Concept of Relative Significance in Deter-
mining Obviousness, 31 IDEA: J. LAW & TECH. 223, 263 (1991) (discussing the problem of
considering how much weight to give to unexpected results when determining
nonobviousness).
224. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1966) (quoting Thomas Jefferson,
the first administrator of the United States patent system, as recognizing the need to have
"'a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclu-
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over previous wide ranging and subjective analyses of what constituted
true invention.2' The relative uncertainty still surrounding the doctrine
of equivalents, however, is likely due to the selective focus on objective
facts such as the relevant prior art and the pioneering nature of the
claimed invention.226
The challenge of consistent and predictable application of the doctrine
of equivalents requires identification of the interests sought to be served
by the patent system and the doctrine,227 development of a theory as to
how those interests are best achieved,22  and articulation of objective
standards with sufficient clarity to achieve the stated interests.229 One
possibility entails increased emphasis on objective considerations, such as
the teachings of the prior art and the determination of when an invention
is a pioneering invention. 3 This approach must be coupled with a clear
statement as to whether a pioneer invention is entitled to exclude others
from practicing all improvements that flow from that invention. 231 Clar-
sive patent, and those which are not"'); supra notes 31-32 (identifying the policies driving
the first patent statutes in the United States).
225. Rich, supra note 72, at 404.
226. See generally supra notes 157-80 and accompanying text.
227. Aside from the often repeated interests of the public's right as to the scope of the
patent grant provided by the claim language, the elimination of fraud, and avoiding slavish
conformity to the claim language, the broader question turns on a policy decision regarding
an inventor's proper scope of protection. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 840, 852-68, 877 (1990)
(reviewing the tensions in the current infringement analysis and concluding that the proper
patent scope should promote competition in research instead of unified control).
228. For an explanation of reward theory, prospect theory, and rent dissipation, see
Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305,
310-21 (1992) (proposing rent dissipation as an accurate model for assessing the goals of
the patent system).
229. A detailed economic analysis of the proper scope of patent coverage is a necessity
in articulating a policy and a rule. Because this Comment does not provide such an analy-
sis of the economic theories, no position is taken on the proper scope of patent claims.
230. See supra note 165 (listing objective criteria in identifying a pioneering invention
as the relative sparseness of prior art relating to the invention, and whether a claimed
invention provides a function never before provided).
231. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that an improvement of a patent does
not necessarily escape infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that use of an on-
board computer that was not developed at the time the invention was patented was an
improvement that did not escape the doctrine of equivalents). However, the court may
escape this broad statement of policy by finding that the improvement is so substantial that
the accused device does not operate in the same way as that claimed. See Texas Instru-
ments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(stating that the accused device did not infringe a pioneering patent to a hand-held calcula-
tor because the technological changes in the accused device were too great). The policy
could also be avoided by a strict application of a rigid element by element analysis. See
supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text (noting the ability of the courts to justify a
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ity in the law may also be provided by expanding the scope of a claim
only when objective criteria identifying a pioneering invention are pres-
ent, just as the identification and discussion of objective criteria are nec-
essary to support a holding of obviousness. 2 Increased focus on
objective considerations rather than sole reliance on the tripartite test of
Graver Tank will increase predictability, decrease predatory litigation,
and stimulate judicial opinions relating objective facts to the equivalents
definition.
III. CONCLUSION
Issues under the obviousness of inventions and the doctrine of
equivalents are controlled by a similar analysis, a comparison of the claim
to an outside standard, whether the outside standard is prior art or an
accused infringing device. Each analysis is ultimately answered by a defi-
nition of what difference between the claim and the outside standard is
sufficient to defeat patentability or a finding of infringement. The current
obviousness analysis based on objective criteria provides judicial opinions
properly based on relevant facts. The doctrine of equivalents should like-
wise consistently require analysis of objective facts such as the prior art
and the pioneering nature of the claimed invention to avoid the uncer-
tainty presently surrounding its application.
Stephen G. Kalinchak
holding of either infringement or noninfringement by characterization of either a single
claim limitation or a group of limitations as an element).
232. See supra notes 84-87 (discussing the three part inquiry of Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)).
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